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Introduction
The 2007-2009 global …nancial crisis has painfully demonstrated how costly a systemic failure can be. Systemic events impose high costs on taxpayers as governments usually intervene by bailing out important institutions in an e¤ort to ensure the survival of the …nancial system. Unfortunately, the implementation of such policies are also part of the causes of the next crisis. This is because they encourage opportunistic behavior by these same institutions in anticipation of the government policies. This "moral hazard" problem is central to understanding the dilemma with which policy makers are faced.
The study of …nancial crises has been on the research agenda of …nancial economists for a long time now. 1 One particular aspect of systemic crises that has recently attracted a lot of attention is that of contagion. Even if an initial shock a¤ects only a small number of institutions, the connectivity of the …nancial system (for example, because of the interbank market, the payments system, portfolio correlations. etc.) implies that the shock will be transmitted widely, and will increasingly often cross international boundaries. 2 Some researchers have applied the tools of network theory, that is ideally suitable for the analysis of interconnected systems, to the study of systemic events. 3 What becomes clear from this work is that both the number of a¤ected institutions and the …nancial system's volume of losses depend not only on the aggregate volume of risk exposures but also on their distribution within the system and the structure of that system. 4 Simple models are very useful for providing a conceptual framework so that we can gain an intuitive understanding of the relationship between network structure and systemic risk. However, they fall short of providing practical guidance to regulators and policymakers in relation to actual …nancial networks that consist of a large number on institutions with a huge number of links between them. What we need are tools for the study of such systems so that we can get better estimates of both the likelihood of contagion and systemic risk. The ecologist Robert May has been a strong advocate of the application of complex systems analysis to the study of …nancial networks. 5 Over the last 10 years, many researchers have followed this promising line of research by using these analytical tools to improve our understanding of the …nancial sector in general and banking systems in particular. 6 In this paper, we review this new and fast growing literature paying special attention to issues related to the measurement of systemic risk. In the following section we review various proposals for measuring systemic risk that use traditional …nance tools. In the subsequent two sections we review theoretical and empirical contributions that employ complex networks techniques to the analysis of systemic risk. In the 1 See Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) for a review of this literature. 2 For an interesting exposition of the geographic distribution of bank failures during the recent global …nancial crisis see Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) . 3 For expositions of network theory and its applications to economics see Goyal (2009) , Jackson (2008) and Vega-Redondo (2007) . 4 See Allen and Babus (2009) for a review of various applications of network theory to the study of …nancial issues. 5 See, for example, Haldane and May (2011) and May and Sugihara (2008) . For a similar perspective on the bene…ts of network analysis, see also Schweitzer et al. (2009) . 6 There is an established literature, known as econophysics, that has used complex systems to analyze various economic systems icluding the behavior of asset prices (for a review see Varela et al. (2013) 
this volume).
…nal section we brie ‡y evaluate the progress that has been made so far and identify areas for further research.
2 Non-Network Approaches to Measuring Systemic Risk
Since the 2007-2009 global …nancial great emphasis has been placed on developing both theoretical and practical measures of systemic risk. 7 Some researchers have opted for a structural approach while others have worked with reducedform approaches that focus on the behavior of asset returns in the tail of the distribution. The structural approach requires a general equilibrium model and explicit restrictions on structural errors so that the parameters of behavioral functions can be estimated. In contrast, the goal of reduced-form studies is to provide estimates for these parameters using exogenous within-sample variation minimizing the reliance on structural assumptions.
The structural approach is followed by Gray et al. (2008) who propose the use of Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) to evaluate the sensitivity of an economic system's balance sheets to external shocks. CCA treats risky debt, which raises the possibility of default and thus systemic risk, as a put option. 8 If one type of risky debt (loans from banks to …rms) is linked to another type of risky debt (loans from banks to banks), the second type of risky debt can be expressed as a function of the implicit put option of the …rst type of risky debt. Strong non-linearities in risk transmission can potentially arise from this compound nature of interlinked risky debt. 9 Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) view the banking system as a portfolio of banks from which they infer the banking system's multivariate density. Their measures re ‡ect not only linear dependencies within the system (correlations) but also non-linear distress dependencies that alter through time. Employing a non-parametric copula approach they are able to distinguish between (a) common distress in the system, (b) distress between speci…c banks, and (c) cascade e¤ects. They use their approach to derive a variety of bank stability measures and then use them to estimate changes in the stability of the US banking system over time, to estimate cross-regional e¤ects between American and European banking groups and to assess the impact of international banks on sovereigns.
One advantage of the structural approach is that it allows one to derive consistent measures for the marginal risk contribution of each institution in the system. These measures are consistent in the sense that they add up to the aggregate systemic risk. This has been the motivation behind the work by Tarashev et al. (2010) who use a game-theoretic methodology to apportion system-wide risk to individual institutions. In particular, they use the Shapley Value (a solution for cooperative games) that allocates payo¤s to players that 7 For a review of systemic risk measures applied to general …nancial systems see Markelo¤ et al. (2012) . See also European Central Bank (2007) for some theoretical and empirical contributions related to the measuremnt of systemic risk in banking and non-banking …nancial systems. 8 A put option is a derivative that o¤ers the right, but not the obligation, to the holder to sell the underlying asset at a pre-speci…ed price within a given period. 9 For an example of CCA see Lehar (2005) who applies the methodology to a sample of international banks from 1988 until 2002. are equal to their marginal contributions. The idea is simple but appealing. The marginal contribution to risk of an institution to a group of banks is the amount by which the aggregate risk of the group increases when that bank is added. Consider all the possible groups of banks and evaluate the marginal contribution of the particular bank to each of them. The overall contribution to risk of the bank in question is then a weighed sum of all these marginal contributions. Huang et al. (2012) also construct systemic risk measures satisfying consistency, but use a di¤erent approach. They use equity-price comovements and Credit Default Swap (CDS) 10 spreads to construct hypothetical insurance premiums against catastrophic losses in the banking system. The …rst factor provides a measure of asset return correlations while the second measures the probability of default. Applying their methodology to the US banking system the authors …nd that a bank's systemic risk contribution is primarily determined by its size and to a lesser extent by the correlation of asset returns and default probability.
CDS prices are also used, together with bond prices, by Giglio (2011) who develops an alternative method for measuring joint default risk of large …nancial institutions. Bond prices o¤er information about the default probability of the issuer while CDS prices, that pay only if the seller of the insurance contract is solvent, contain information about the probability of joint default. This allows one to derive pairwise default probabilities within the …nancial system. However, it is not su¢ cient to characterize the systemic risk (joint default risk) of multiple institutions. Then, the author develops a general theory of probability bounds that permits the construction of tightest bounds for probabilities of high-order events given the availability of a low-order information set. The author applies the methodology to follow the evolution of default risk of large banks during the 2007-2009 …nancial crisis and …nds that the majority of spikes in bond and CDS prices corresponded to changes in idiosyncratic rather than systemic risk.
Turning now to the studies that focus on the tail of the return distribution, Acharya et al. (2010) derive a theoretical measure of systemic risk, namely the Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES) which is equal to the expected amount that a bank is undercapitalized in a future systemic event in which the overall …-nancial system is undercapitalized. Their theory suggests that the regulation of systemic risk should depend on each institution's SES and the overall probability of a systemic event. For practical purposes regulators need to estimate the conditional expected losses before a crisis occurs and according to the theory they should use any variable that is a good predictor of capital shortfall during a systemic event. They propose that the regulators estimate the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) that corresponds to the amount of expected losses during moderately bad days together with the level of leverage as predictors for SES. The authors use data from 2007-2009 during the …nancial crisis to demonstrate that their measure of systemic risk would have been a good predictor of subsequent measures of risks, such as outcomes of stress tests, the decline in equity evaluations, and the widening of credit default swap spreads. Hartmann et al. (2005) apply Extreme Value Theory (EVT) on bank equity prices which allows them to estimate the probability of contagion between banks, the sensitivity of banks asset returns to aggregate shocks and also the ‡uctuations of those risks over time. In particular, they construct two indicators of systemic risk. The …rst indicator captures bank contagion risk by measuring extreme comovements of bank asset returns. The second indicator captures the impact of aggregate portfolio shocks on individual banks' stock returns. The authors apply their methodology to US and European banking systems …nding that while systemic risk has increased in both regions during the 1990s, systemic risk is higher in the US than in the Euro area, probably due to the weaker cross-border European banking linkages relative to U.S. ones.
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Value at risk (VaR) is a common measure of risk used by …nancial institutions. For example the 5%-VaR is the maximum loss within the 5% con…dence interval. Clearly, a single institution's measure of risk cannot re ‡ect systemic aspects of risk. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) propose an alternative measure that they refer to as CoVaR. An institution's CoVaR is equal to the VaR of the whole system conditional on that institution being in a particular state (distress or no-distress). By taking the di¤erence between the CoVaR conditional on the institution being in distress minus the CoVaR conditional on the institution not being in distress the authors derive CoVaR that captures the marginal contribution of that particular institution to systemic risk. However, from a regulatory point of view what is needed is a forward looking measure that would be a good predictor of future systemic events. To this end, the authors estimate forward looking time-varying measures of CoVaR using weekly data from 1986Q1 to 2010Q4 and show that the 2006Q4 value would have predicted over half of realized covariances during the global …nancial crisis. 12 More closely related to the network literature, Billio et al. (2012) derive econometric measures of the degree of connectedness, and hence systemic risk, for four …nancial sectors, namely, hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurance companies. They use principal-components analysis to uncover the degree of connectedness among the institutions in the four sectors and then they apply Granger causality tests in order to identify the direction of links. Their results suggest that among the four sectors the most important in transmitting shocks is the banking sector.
Systemic Risk in Complex Financial Networks: Theoretical Developments
There is a steadily increasing literature suggesting that our understanding of systemic risk, and hence our ability to measure it, will be greatly enhanced by taking a close look at the topological properties of the network of transactions that link …nancial institutions together. 13 A typical …nancial network can be graphically represented by a set of nodes, one for each institution, and a set of weighted and directed links representing the bilateral …nancial relationships between those institutions. Depending on the application these values can measure either …nancial exposures (e.g. interbank deposits) or …nancial transactions (e.g. interbank payments market) over a period of time. Figure 1 shows the 1 1 The second indicator, known as Tail-, has been also applied to the European banking system by De Jonghe (2010). The graph of a network of n banks can also be presented by a n n realvalued matrix A. An entry ij represents the level of deposits of bank i at bank j. For example, a matrix corresponding to the network shown in Notice that along the diagonal all entries are equal to 0 capturing the fact that a bank does not hold deposits with itself. To keep things simple we have considered only three possible levels of exposure. In the above matrix entry 12 = 100 which corresponds, in Figure 1 , to the high weighted arrow connecting bank 1 with bank 2 and pointing at bank 2 and indicating that bank 1's level of deposits at bank 2 is equal to 100.
As we explain in more detail below, introducing a shock into the system is equivalent to disturbing some of these links. Analyzing the systemic consequences of that shock involves not only tracing the path of links that connects the institution where the shock was realized with the rest of the system but also taking into consideration their weights. In what follows we focus on research related to the analysis of banking systems, starting with simple networks and then moving to complex ones. 14 
Simple Banking Networks
This literature builds on some earlier work on interbank relationships that explores the negative externality that a failure of one bank imposes on the rest of the system; see, in particular, Bitzer and DeMarzo (1992) and Rochet and Tirole (1996) . The main contribution of the following papers is the recognition that in a multi-banking system the speci…c link pattern of the network matters.
For example, Allen and Gale (2000) analyze the transmission of liquidity shocks within a four-bank network where the role of each bank is to provide liquidity insurance as in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Allen and Gale (1998). 15 The authors …nd that the systemic impact of an initial shock crucially depends on the structure of the network. When all banks are interconnected to each other, that is the structure of the network is complete, then cross-holding of liquidity can be su¢ cient to absorb the shock without banks having to liquidate long-term assets. In contrast, when the structure is incomplete, the impact of the shock might be felt very strongly by banks immediately linked to the one that su¤ered the initial shock resulting in the liquidation of their long-term assets. As each subsequent link is a¤ected the crisis spreads throughout the system.
Allen and Babus (2010) compare the systemic risk consequences of two network structures each consisting of six banks. In both structures each bank forms links with two other banks. In one structure, which the authors call clustered, there are two networks each consisting of three banks. In the unclustered version there is a single network with a cyclical structure. The authors concentrate their analysis on the case of short-term debt that requires rollover between periods and hence raises the possibility of systemic risk. For risk diversi…cation purposes banks exchange assets within their network. The exchange of assets implies that under the clustered structure banks hold identical portfolios while this is not the case in the unclustered version. The authors …nd that the likelihood of early liquidation and thus systemic risk is higher in the clustered version but, if the proceeds from early liquidation are su¢ ciently high, the welfare of depositors can still be greater under the clustered structure.
Leitner (2005) takes one step back by asking if having a network o¤ers any advantages. The author compares a complete network with one where every node is isolated and …nds a trade-o¤. On one hand, there are insurance bene…ts due to the cross-links between banks but, on the other hand, this also raises the possibility of the whole network collapsing. Furthermore, when liquidity is concentrated in a small number of institutions the latter might opt not to participate. Similarly, Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007) …nd that the network structure depends on the level of counterparty risk. The network is generally characterized by a core-periphery structure where the core consists of safe banks that are fully connected but the degree of connectivity between the core and the periphery (risky banks) depends on the level of counterparty risk. Issues related to network formation are also addressed by Babus (2009) . In this model network formation is endogenous and the author shows that the optimal network structure is stable and reduces the risk of contagion.
Complex Banking Networks
A bank or a group of banks, can be potentially a¤ected by two types of shocks. A sudden strong demand for liquidity can force the banks, after they exhaust their reserves, to use their deposits at other banks. This can initiate a domino e¤ect that, depending on the network structure, can spread throughout the system. As long as there are enough liquid assets in the system, interbank deposits might be su¢ cient to absorb the demand for liquidity. However, if for some banks their deposits in the rest of the system are not su¢ cient to meet the demand for liquidity they might have to liquidate some of their long-term assets. If selling those assets depresses their prices this can lead to insolvency which is related to the second type of shock that is a direct hit on the asset side of the balance-sheet. In this case a bank has to write-o¤ a signi…cant fraction of its long-term assets mainly caused by the inability of its borrowers to pay back their debts. The theoretical literature that uses complex network techniques to address issues of contagion focuses on the systemic risk consequences of the second type of shock.
Caballero and Simsek (2009) analyse information transmission in a cyclical network structure where each bank is directly informed about its risk exposure to its neighbors. While most of the time this structure is su¢ ciently stable, in periods of high …nancial distress, when each bank becomes interested in its exposure to other banks through indirect links, the cost of information gathering becomes unmanageable and an …nancial crisis ensues. In a related study Anand et al. (2011) use a mean-…eld approximation to analyse how banks can coordinate on a strategy which can lead to ine¢ cient information aggregation and can then switch to coordinate on another strategy in which all information is revealed and the market crashes.
Many authors examine how network connectivity is related to systemic risk. Iori et al. (2006) …nd that when the network of banks is heterogenous, an interbank market can have ambiguous consequences for systemic risk. The bene…ts of mutual insurance need to be contrasted to the possibility of contagion. The authors also report that as the connectivity increases the system becomes more stable, echoing the …nding of Allen and Gale (1998). Similar conclusions in relation to the degree of network connectivity are reached by Gai and Kapadia (2010), Montagna and Lux (2013) and Nier et al. (2007) . The former paper also compares the impacts of indiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. With relatively high capital to total assets ratios the system can survive the former type of shock but with aggregate shocks contagion risk signi…cantly increases. Montagna and Lux (2013) analyse scale-free networks while the other papers focus on random networks. 16 A scale-free topology arises endogenously in Cruz and Lind (2012). The authors show that the distribution of 'avalanches'(systemic events) follows a power-law. In their model higher capital requirements by o¤ering incentives to banks to increase the market concentration of the banking system can enhance the likelihood of systemic events.
Two related topics that have attracted a lot of attention in the …nance literature as a result of the global …nancial crisis are '…re sales' and 'market freezes'. 17 Both of these issues have also been addressed using the network approach. For example, Cifuentes et al. (2005) analyse the transmission of shocks in systems that use marking to market practices. In such systems, sales of assets by depressing asset prices can induce further round of sales. The authors show that small initial shocks can generate huge systemic e¤ects and that the exact aggregate exposure depends on the particular structure of the network. They also suggest that imposing liquidity requirements can be more e¤ective than capital regulations in averting a crisis. May and Arinaminpathy (2010) use a mean-…eld approach to derive analytical results in relation to …re sales. They demonstrate how the impact of contagion depends not only on the size of the shock and the level of asset devaluation but also on the asset classes a¤ected by the shock. Nier et al. (2007) observe that the e¤ects of …re sales are more pronounced in higher concentrated systems. An example of a market freeze where banks decline to rollover debt is o¤ered in Anand et al. (2012) . The authors …nd that the spread of contagion depends on the maturity structure of loans and the rate at which adverse news spread in the system. When the endogenous probability of bank failure is su¢ ciently high their model also generates market freezes where banks decline to lend to each other.
Some researchers compare the impact on systemic risk of various network structures. Acemoglu et al. (2013) compare complete networks with networks that have a ring structure. They …nd that although complete networks are generally more stable, under extreme conditions 18 , the high number of interconnections can also be responsible for higher fragility. The authors also assess the welfare properties of network systems formed in a decentralized way and they …nd that, as banks do not internalize the negative externality that their liquidity management decisions impose on the rest of the system, overall aggregate liquidity is suboptimal. 19 Contagion and cascades are analysed using variety of network structures by Elliott et al. (2013) . In particular, the authors explore how changes in the degrees of integration (how far an institution depends on its counterparties) and diversi…cation (number of counterparties) a¤ect the spread of defaults through the system. Lenzu and Tedeschi (2012) compare systemic risk in random formed and scale-free networks. The authors …nd that scale-free networks are more vulnerable because of (a) sub-optimal liquidity allocation, and (b) higher heterogeneity among participants which increases the exposure of the banking system to contagion. Teteryatnikova (2012) assesses the advantages of multi-tier systems …nding that the resilience of the banking network to systemic shocks increases with the level of tiering.
In an alternative application of network analysis Eisenberg and Nose (2001) develop an algorithm that not only provides an e¢ cient way for clearing the interbank network following a shock but also provides measures of the systemic risk by each bank in the system. Their results suggest that an increase in the system's cash ‡ow volatility by reducing the payments across institutions lowers the asset value of the banking system. Lastly, more recently, Battistin et al. (2012) have proposed an alternative measue of systemic risk developed within the complex network framework which they called DebtRank. This new measure takes into account how an institution's (or a group's) …nancial distress impacts its counterparties across the …nancial network.
Systemic Risk in Complex Financial Networks: Applications
Two distinct empirical methodologies have been developed to use complex networks to analyse issues related to …nancial stability. One methodology uses simulations for counterfactual analysis and has been widely applied to many types of …nancial transactions. The other methodology analyses the topological structure of …nancial networks in order to assess their stability.
Counterfactual Analysis
One advantage of applying complex network techniques to the analysis of shock propagation is that it allows for counterfactual analysis. where summing across columns P j ij gives the total deposits of bank i at all other banks and summing across rows P i ij gives the total deposits of the banking system in bank j. In order to obtain an estimate of bilateral exposures researchers commonly assume that an entity's assets are spread as evenly as possible given the balance sheet positions of every other entity. Technically, this amounts to the maximization of entropy of the network's linkages. Intuitively, the solution corresponds to the most likely structure of bilateral links given what the researchers know about the level of gross exposures.
Across the various studies that have followed the counterfactual approach there is considerable variation in the level of data aggregation. Below we separate them into two groups, namely, those studies in which nodes represent institutions and those that use higher levels of aggregation.
Risk Exposure at the Institutional Level
The majority of studies that look at the network links of national interbank payments systems use simulations to assess the contagious e¤ects of bank failures. Overall, the evidence of systemic risk is quite mixed. Substantial risk of contagion is reported by Degryse and Nguyen (2007) 
' Macro'Approaches
Closely related to the structural approach to measuring systemic risk is the work of a strand of the network literature that follows a macro methodology to analyse cross-border …nancial contagion. The common theme of this work is an abstraction from institutional details by focusing on sector level connections. The level of aggregation that macro approaches use for the construction of networks is signi…cantly higher that that used in other applications.
Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) use data on bilateral exposures while Castrén and Kavonius (2009) All three studies strongly suggest that the network structures are timevariant, …nding an increase in the number of sector links throughout the period leading to the global …nancial crisis of [2008] [2009] . The studies also conclude that factors related to the initial shock, such as geographical location, type of …nancial instrument, economic sector and country of origin, matter signi…cantly for its potential impact both geographically and quantitatively.
Topological Structure of Actual Financial Networks
This literature aims to identify and analyse the network topology of the credit links between actual …nancial institutions. The corresponding theoretical research, reviewed above, clearly suggests that the level of systemic risk crucially depends on the particular structure of the network that includes in addition to topological properties, i.e. random, fully connected, etc., the direction and weights of its links. Empirical implementations of this approach can be very useful given that it allows researchers to identify potential systemic weaknesses in networks that involve thousands of daily transactions between a large number of institutions. However, for a long time, lack of data availability has restricted research to calibrations of theoretical models. This has changed over the last 10 years with the availability of data sets reporting real time bilateral settlements between pairs of institutions in the system. Using data from various types of …nancial markets located all over the world researchers have identi…ed their corresponding topological structures. Some researchers have then used the structure revealed in this way to perform simulations aiming to identify any risk vulnerabilities within the corresponding payment system. In particular, it is consistent with the existence of 'too big to fail'institutions that usually are positioned at the top of the hierarchy. The presence of these institutions is responsible for the 'hub and spoke'structure of the graphs of these networks which exhibit short distances between banks even when the frequency of direct relationships is low.
A hierarchical structure is exogenously imposed on the UK system. There is a two-tier system where the top consists of only 15 banks. So-called 'secondtier' banks have to settle their payments through one of the banks in the top tier. Becher et al. (2008) analyse the topological structure of the UK twotier system and compare its stability properties with those of the US system.
The authors note that the network structures are similar in the two systems, however, they also …nd that there are di¤erences in their risk characteristics. In particular, there is a trade-o¤ where the increased risk exposures between the two-tiers is counterbalanced by the bene…ts derived from (a) liquidity pooling and (b) greater coordination between banks. In a related study Adams et al. (2010) simulate a simple model of network formation, where each bank can either transact directly with another bank or through a correspondent bank. The authors show that the model is capable of generating a network structure similar to that observed in the UK two-tier system that is driven only by the underlying pattern of payments and the structure of liquidity costs.
The structure of the system can also depend on the level of aggregation of transactions. Finger et al. (2012) using bank transactions from the Italian payments system …nd that when they use daily data the network is random, however, when they move to quarterly frequencies the structure becomes more asymmetric. Put di¤erently, the network exhibits a more hierarchical structure at higher aggregation frequencies, though, still lower than those found for other national systems. They also emphasize that networks constructed at higher aggregation levels have properties that are more stable (less sensitive to the sampling period).
Analyzing the …nancial stability characteristics of the Colombian payments system, León et al. (2012) o¤er an example that demonstrates how important it is not to focus exclusively to institutions that are 'too big too fail'but also to those that are 'too interconnected too fail'. 21 Focusing only on the former type of …nancial institutions in the case of Colombia would have ignored a small-size bank which, because of its high connectivity, imposed potentially a high risk of systemic failure.
Cross-Border Transactions
The study of topological properties is not exclusively restricted to national payments systems. A number of researchers have used the rich transactions data from the Bank of International Settlements to analyse the topology of the network of international payments. For example, Hattori and Suda (2007) use the dataset to analyse the evolution of the topology of the network of crossborder bank exposures and they …nd that it has become more tightly connected over time. The network's connectivity, degree and clustering coe¢ cient have increased over time while the average path length has declined. Interestingly, systemic events such as the East Asia twin-crisis in 1997 and the LTCM collapse in 1998 did not disturb this trend. The authors comparing the advantages and disadvantages of these developments suggest that while this higher connectivity o¤ers better opportunities for portfolio diversi…cation and capital allocation it also enhances the likelihood of systemic risk and Haldane (2009) has suggested that over emphasis of the bene…cial e¤ects of increased connectivity led economists to under estimate the negative e¤ects of the changes in the other network measures. The evolution of the international payments network is also studied by Garratt et al. (2011) . They report that the network has changed drastically since the late 1980s. At that time when four …nancial centres formed one large supercluster the risk of contagion was quite high within its members but much lower globally. Since then the most in ‡uential centres have become signi…cantly smaller but the risk of global contagion has signi…cantly grown.
Von Peter (2007) identi…es, in the cross-border international payment system, the same hub and spoke structure that characterizes most of the national payment systems. The author also …nds that the relatively higher interconnected …nancial centres, and thus the more important from a systemic risk perspective, are not necessarily the largest in size. McGuire and Tarashev (2008) show how the BIS statistics can be used to identify potentially vulnerable …nancial centres and provide measurements of their exposure to shocks of various magnitudes.
Other Financial Markets
The majority of research on national …nancial systems is concentrated on the study of payments systems. Nevertheless, there are still a few applications of the network topology approach to other markets. Rørdam and Bech (2009) compare the networks of the money market and the payments system (Figure 8b ) in Denmark. The payments network consists of banks'proprietary transactions and customer driven transactions while the money market network consists of overnight money market loans. The authors …nd that the structures of the two networks di¤er considerably. While activity in the payments network is dominated by two commercial banks that in the overnight market is more evenly distributed. In contrast to other studies they do not …nd that the degree distribution of the network is scale-free.
Bech and Atalay (2010) by concentrating on a sub-set of the transactions recorded by the Fedwire system are able to identify the network of the US federal funds market. These are overnight interbank loans that depend on the size of the reserves that the lender holds at the federal reserve system. In accordance with the results reported by Somaräki et al. (2007b) in relation to the total transactions in the Fedwire system, the authors …nd that the federal funds network exhibits the small-world phenomenon and that the distribution of the number of a bank's counterparties follows a fat-tailed distribution, whereby the vast majority of banks have a few counterparties and a small number of banks have many. However, they also report that the degree distribution of the federal funds market network is not necessarily best represented by a power law distribution.
A similar structure to the one for the federal funds market is reported by Markose et al. (2010) for the US market for Credit Default Swaps . The market is extremely concentrated with …ve banks dominating (92%) the activity in these transactions.
Moving Forward
In this paper we have reviewed recent advances in …nancial economics in relation to the measurement of systemic risk. We have started by reviewing studies that apply traditional measures of risk to …nancial institutions. Such studies use balance-sheet data to gather information about a …nancial institution's risk exposure, market data to assess its performance and aggregate data for assigning weights that capture the relative contribution of the institution to systemic risk. Ultimately, the aim is to use reliable measures of contributions to systemic risk for developing pricing schemes that will o¤er incentives to …nancial institutions to internalize the externalities that they impose on the rest of the system. Acharya et al. (2009a) describe some interesting proposals aimed at achieving this last goal. 22 The main focus of the review has been on studies that use network analysis paying special attention to those that apply complex analysis techniques. Applications of these techniques for the analysis and pricing of systemic risk has already provided signi…cant bene…ts at least at the conceptual level but it also looks very promising from a practical point of view. 23 The basic idea is that what matters for the evaluation of potential systemic consequences of a shock is not only the level of aggregate bilateral risk exposure within the …nancial system (for example the volume of interbank deposits) but also how this exposure is distributed within the system (the network of interbank deposits). As a …rst step complex network analysis can be used to trace the contagion e¤ects of a particular shock throughout the system. But perhaps even more importantly it can be used to provide reliable measures for the exposure of the whole system to that shock.
At the theoretical level, signi…cant progress has been made on both of these objectives. Considerable advances have also been made in relation to the …rst objective at the empirical level. In particular, the topological properties of a wide variety of …nancial systems around the world, both at the national level and at the level of cross-border transactions, have already been identi…ed. Where improvement is still needed is in using the new tools for deriving practical measures of systemic risk. By practical we mean measures that regulators can use to design insurance pricing schemes for potentially catastrophic events.
The design of optimal schemes would take into account not only the aggregate risk exposure of a network to various kind of shocks but also the incentives that participating institution have to form one type of network over another. The recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2013) does exactly that at the theoretical level. Two issues that have restricted progress at the empirical level are lack of data and measurement problems. We have already discussed above the problem that researchers, who apply counterfactual analysis, face when they only have data for gross bilateral exposures. At this point, we focus on an alternative challenge that is related to the evaluation of systemic losses as a shock propagates throughout the system. Clearly, if the losses are restricted to those directly related to the initial shock connectivity would not be a problem. In fact, the more connected a network is, the easier will be to di¤use the losses throughout the system without putting the system itself into danger. What this simplistic analysis ignores is the presence of market imperfections that are responsible for externalities related to (a) …re sales and market freezes (e.g., Acharya et al. (2011) and Diamond and Rajan (2011)), and (b) liquidity spirals (e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) ). Earlier, we have reviewed a number of theoretical contributions that allow for these e¤ects within the context of complex network analysis. In contrast, counterfactual and simulations analyses that use actual …nancial networks as a starting point, usually employ an algorithm developed by Fur…ne (2003) , that assigns an exogenously given parameter (LGD -loss-given-default) each round for these losses. Bridging the gap between theory and applied research in this particular area would add considerably to the attractiveness of the new methodologies.
Finally, some authors have suggested that it might be wise to identify clusters of …nancial institutions that potentially, because of either/both their size or/and high connectivity, impose disproportional higher risk on the rest of the system. The recent maximum likelihood methods developed by µ Copiµ c et al. (2009) for identifying such clusters in network structures might be a promising option.
